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ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE
TO AWARD MS. KRANENDONK HER LITIGATION EXPENSES.

In her opening brief, Ms. Kranendonk de1nonstrated (1) that litigation

expenses are recoverable for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty where the
attorney's conduct in litigation is largely responsible for the1n and (2) that
Defendants' litigation conduct is largely responsible for her expenses. (Br. of
Appellee and Cross-Appellant ("Br. of Cross-Appellant") 62-65.) In response,
~

Defendants do not dispute that their litigation conduct is largely responsible for
Ms. Kranendonk's litigation expenses. (See Reply Br. of Appellants and Br. of
Cross-Appellees ("Br. of Cross-Appellees") 34-38.)
They still contend, however, that Ms. Kranendonk should not be awarded
her reasonable and necessary litigation expenses. Their argu1nent rests, first, on
the assertion that "Ms. Kranendonk has not provided any rationale for extending
the ... award of litigation expenses in Campbell to all cases involving a breach of
fiduciary duty." (Id. at 36.) Second, Defendants contend (1) that, in any event, the
trial court already awarded Ms. Kranendonk her reasonable and necessary
expenses and (2) that an award of "litigation expenses" under Campbell is subject
to the same statutory constraints as an award of "costs" is under rule 54( d) of the

..,;J

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. at 37-39.) Defendants are 1nistaken on all
counts.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law1 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

Ms. Kranendonk has provided a compelling rationale for
awarding litigation expenses for an attorney's breach of
fiduciary duty.

In Campbell v. State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT 89, 65

P.3d 1134, rev'don other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), this Court recognized "that
breach of a fiduciary obligation is a well-established exception to the A1nerican
rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases generally" and awarded fees against
an insurer who breached its fiduciary duty. Id.

,r 122. The Court then said: "For

the same reasons detailed in the ... section regarding attorney fees, we conclude
that litigation expenses are [also] recoverable in this lhnited type of action[.]" Id.

,r 127. By "this limited type of action," the Court plainly meant actions where an
insurer breaches its fiduciary duty to its insured and then engages in "litigation
conduct [that is] largely responsible for [the insured's litigation expenses]." 1 See

In her opening brief, Ms. Kranendonk quoted Campbell's holding regarding
litigation expenses as follows: '"[O]ur determination [is] that litigation expenses
may be awarded in [insurer breach of fiduciary duty cases] in which the
defendant's litigation conduct has been largely responsible for them."' (Br. of
Cross-Appellant 62 (quoting Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ,r 127, 65 P.3d 1134).)
Defendants note that, without alteration, the foregoing quotation reads: "'[O]ur
determination [is] that litigation expenses may be awarded in bad faith insurance
cases"'; and they now assert that "[t]he language of Campbell does not support
Ms. Kranendonk's generous alteration" of that quotation. (Brief of CrossAppellees 36 n.11 (quoting Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ,r 127, 65 P.3d 1134 (emphasis
added)).) Defendants are again mistaken. Campbell involved third-party
insurance bad faith. See 2001 UT 89, 'jf,1120-22, 65 P.3d 1134. In the third-party
insurance context, an insurer acts in bad faith when it breaches its fiduciary duty.
See id.; Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985). Thus,
when Campbell says that "litigation expenses may be awarded in bad faith
1

2
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id. In short, this Court concluded that if attorney fees are awardable for breach of

fiduciary duty, so are litigation expenses, and for the same reasons. See id.
The Court then restated those reasons as follows:
For the sa1ne reasons detailed in the ... section regarding attorney
fees, we conclude that litigation expenses are recoverable in this
limited type of action; their availability will: (1) decrease incentives
for insurers to act in bad faith; (2) encourage insurers to act
reasonably; and (3) contribute to actual compensation for plaintiffs
for financial cost to them of the breach.

Id. Then the Court observed that the insurer's defense in that case had been
"'labored, vexatious and burdensome'" and that the insurer '"knew or should
have known that its oppressive defense ... would be extre1nely costly to
~

plaintiffs."' Id. Finally, the Court noted that the foregoing" observations
underscore[ d] the policy reasons supporting [its] detennination that litigation
expenses may be awarded in insurance [breach of fiduciary duty] cases in which
the defendant's litigation conduct has been largely responsible for them." Id.
The Court's rationale in Campbell for allowing an award of litigation
expenses against an insurer for breach of fiduciary duty is equally applicable
here because allowing an award of litigation expenses against an attorney for
breach of fiduciary duty will (1) decrease incentives for attorneys to breach their
insurance cases," it is saying exactly that litigation expenses may be awarded in
insurer breach of fiduciary duty cases. Ms. Kranendonk' s replacement of the
phrase "bad faith insurance cases" with the phrase "insurer breach of fiduciary
duty cases" is, therefore, not a" generous alteration," as the Swapp Firm claims.
Instead, it is a precise restatement of Campbell's holding.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law3Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fiduciary duties, (2) encourage attorneys to act reasonably, especially when they
discover they have made 1nistakes, and (3) contribute to actual compensation for
clients for the financial cost caused by their attorney's breach of duty.
Moreover, just as the Campbell insurer's burdensome defense underscored
the policy reasons supporting an award of litigation expenses for an insurer's
breach of fiduciary duty, Defendants' burdensome defense here likewise
underscores the reasons supporting an extension of the Campbell holding to cases
of attorney breach of fiduciary duty. 2
Concededly, Ms. Kranendonk did not unfold in her opening brief the
foregoing rationale to the extent that she has here. But she relied on it by
reference when she cited the Court's conclusion in Campbell that if fees are
awardable for breach of fiduciary duty, then, for the same reasons, expenses are
recoverable as well, and then said: "Likewise here, for the sa1ne reasons detailed
above regarding attorney fees, the Court should conclude that litigation expenses
are recoverable for an attorney's willful breach of fiduciary duty where the

Because expenses are not recoverable under Campbell unless the fiduciary's
litigation conduct was largely responsible for them-i.e., the fiduciary's litigation
conduct was knowingly burdensome-the holding sought here would not result
in expenses being recoverable in nearly every breach of fiduciary duty case as
Defendants' suggest (see Br. of Cross-Appellees 36). It would, however, mean
that they are recoverable here since Defendants have tacitly conceded that they
knew or should have known that their litigation conduct was largely responsible
for Ms. Kranendonk' s expenses.
2

4
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attorney's litigation conduct is largely responsible for those expenses." (Br. of
Cross-Appellant 62.) Based on the cmnpelling rationale articulated by the Court
in Campbell, relied on by reference in Ms. Kranendonk's opening brief, and
unfolded more fully here, the Court should extend Campbell's holding regarding
litigation expenses and conclude that litigation expenses are recoverable for an
~

attorney's breach of fiduciary duty when the attorney's litigation conduct has
been largely responsible for them.

B.

Defendants conflate II costs" under rule 54( d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure with reasonable and necessary "litigation
expenses" under Campbell, resulting in arguments that are
unsupported by the law.

1.

Defendants are mistaken when they asse1"t that the frial court
afready determined which of Ms. Kranendonk's litigation
expenses were reasonable and necessa1y.

Defendants argue that, even if litigation expenses are awardable here, "Ms.
Kranendonk has not attempted to show - and cannot show - that the district
court abused its discretion in awarding [only] $17,911.82 in litigation expenses."
(Br. of Cross-Appellees 37.) hnplicit in Defendants' foregoing state1nent is the
assertion that the trial court already awarded Ms. Kranendonk her litigation
expenses and determined which of them were reasonable and necessary. (See id.)
Defendants' assertion mistakenly conflates "costs" with "litigation expenses."
~

The trial court expressly distinguished between "costs" and '''litigation expenses"
and then declined to award "litigation expenses," as the trial court explained:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law5Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"There is a distinction to be understood betvveen the legiti111ate and
taxable 'costs' and other 'expenses,' of litigation which may be ever
so necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs."

(R. 7700 (citation omitted).)
[Ms. Kranendonk] argues that all costs-including litigation
expenses - should be awarded as consequential damages in
accordance with Campbell .... However ... , the Court declines to
extend Campbell to encompass the breach of fiduciary duty
established herein and awards only those costs properly taxable in
accordance with rule 54.

(R. 7700 n.3.) As the trial court understood, an award of "costs" under rule 54( d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is different fro1n Campbell's award of
"litigation expenses." See Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ,r 62,
210 P.3d 977 (citations omitted). "Costs are defined as 'those fees which are
(i. ,.•
'l!:lil'

required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and ... which the statutes
authorize to be included in the judgment."' Id. ,I 63 (citation 01nitted). "Costs"
may not include expenses for "trial exhibits, photographs, and certified copies of
docmnents, ... photocopying costs, ... and ... ' [a]ny amount paid over [a]
statutory allowance' for witnesses, travel, or service of process fees." Id. (citations
omitted). Furthermore, the amount of" costs" that are awardable is limited to the
amounts in "'the fee schedule set by statute."' Id. (citation omitted).

6
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On the other hand, "litigation expenses," such as full expert witness fees,
litigation travel expenses, trial exhibits, etc., are allowed under the Campbell rule
that Ms. Kranendonk asks the Court to apply here. See Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ilil
12, 127, 65 P.3d 1134 (affirming award of "$400,747.78 for litigation expenses").
Because "costs" and "litigation expenses" are different and the trial court
~

expressly did not award Ms. Kranendonk litigation expenses, the trial court has
not already determined which of her expenses were reasonable and necessa1y.
Thus, there is no determination of reasonable and necessary litigation expenses
for this Court to review for an abuse of discretion as Defendants suggest.
Rather, there is only the legal question of whether litigation expenses are

(@

recoverable for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty. See id.

,r 127. The Court

should hold that they are when the attorney's litigation conduct is largely
responsible for them, see id., and then re1nand for the trial court to determine in
the first instance which of Ms. Kranendonk' s litigation expenses were reasonable
I@

and necessary, cf State in Interest of A.R., 937 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(stating in a Fourth Amendment context that '"[r]easonableness is in the first

<@

instance for the [trial court] to determine'").

7Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

Defendants are mistaken when they assei-t that the
measure of 1·easonable and necessa1-y -"litigation
expenses" undei- Ca1npbell is subject to the same
statuto1-y const1·aints as ai-e "costs" under rule 54(d).

Defendants' last argument with regard to litigation expenses is that, even
if litigation expenses are recoverable for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty
where the attorney's litigation conduct is largely responsible for the expenses,
such an award "must ... be limited to the expenses recoverable under rule 54(d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Br. of Cross-Appellees 37.) This argument
is at odds with Campbell and, if adopted, would render an award of "litigation
expenses" meaningless.
Defendants' argument is at odds with Campbell because the Court said
there "that the appropriate 1neasure for awarding litigation expenses is whether
such expenses are reasonable and necessary," 2001 UT 89, ,r 128, 65 P.3d 1134,
and made no 1nention of the statutory limits placed on cost awards under rule
54(d). See id.

,r,r 126-30. The statutory lilnits applied to costs awards under rule

54(d) allow for recovery of only filing fees, service of process fees, statutory
witness fees, and essential deposition costs, see Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684,
686-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), yet the Campbell plaintiffs were awarded over
$400,000 in litigation expenses, 2001 UT 89, ,I 12, 65 P.3d 1134, an amount plainly
not constrained by the statutory lilnits applicable under rule 54(d).

8
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Finally, Defendants' argu1nent, if adopted, would render an award of
"litigation expenses" meaningless since such an award would equate to the
award of "costs" that a prevailing party already is entitled to in 1nost cases. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 54( d). As noted above, the purpose of an award of litigation
expenses for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty would be to (1) decrease
~

attorneys' incentives to breach their fiduciary duties, (2) encourage attorneys to
act reasonably, especially when they discover they have made mistakes, and (3)
contribute to actual cmnpensation for clients for the financial cost caused by their
attorney's breach of duty. None of these purposes would be served if "litigation
expenses" were interpreted to be the sa1ne as the "costs" already "allowed as of
course to the prevailing party." Utah R. Civ. P. 54( d).
For their argument, Defendants rely on Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v.

Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35, and Stevenson 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT
App 137,210 P.3d 977. (Br. of Cross-Appellees 37-38.) However, these cases are
I@

inapplicable here. In Stevenson 3rd, "[t]he trial court ruled ... that [the plaintiff's]
litigation expenses, namely, [its] expert witness fees and photocopying costs,

~

were recoverable as consequential damages." 2009 UT App 137,
977. The Court of Appeals disagreed. See id.

,r 23, 210 P.3d

,r,r 62-68. The Court of Appeals

noted the difference between u costs" and "litigation expenses" and then
observed that, while '"costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party

9Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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unless the court directs otherwise,"' id.

,r,r 62-63 (quotiJ.1.g Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)),

"[c]osts and litigation expenses are awardable as consequential da1nages only in
limited circu1nstances," id. ,I 66 (e1nphasis added). It then held that Stevenson 3rd
did not present one of those limited circumstances. See id. For that reason, the
Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's award of full expert witness fees
and photocopying expenses as litigation expenses. Id. ,I 68. If this Court extends

Campbell, as urged, and determines that an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty is
among the limited circumstances where litigation expenses are recoverable, then

Stevenson 3rd is plainly inapplicable.
In Armed Forces, this Court addressed in dicta3 the recoverability of
reasonable and necessary expert witness fees as consequential damages of fraud.

See 2003 UT 14, ,r,r 38-43, 70 P.3d 35. The Court in Armed Forces acknowledged
that in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), it held that in fraud cases "'"the
defrauded party 1nay recover any additional damages which are a natural and

Dicta is that portion of a court's opinion that is "not necessary to the decision of
that case." In re Clark's Estate, 354 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah 1960). The part of Armed
Services that Defendants rely on is the portion addressing the awardability of
"expert fees ... sought as an 'element of fraud-based damages."' (Br. of CrossAppellees 37-38 (citing Armed Forces, 2003 UT 14, ,r,r 41-43, 70 P.3d 35).) Because
the Court said in Armed Forces that it "need not reach" the issue of the awardability of expert fees as an element of fraud-based damages, 2003 UT 14, ,r,r 38,
41-43, 70 P.3d 35, the portion of that case relied on by Defendants is dicta, see In
re Clark's Estate, 354 P.2d at 115. "[T]his [C]ourt is not bound by earlier
dicta."State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568,572 (Utah 1991).
3

10
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proxhnate consequence of the defendant's misrepresentations."'" Armed Forces,
2003 UT 14, 'if 43, 70 P.3d 35 (quoting Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1250). Yet the Court then
instructed the Armed Forces trial court on remand to limit the amount of expert
witness fees it awarded in that fraud case to the a1nount allowed for wih1ess fees
under rule 54(d), saying: "No Utah statute provides for extra compensation to
(0)

expert witnesses in fraud cases. In Young we 1nade it clear that 'even if necessary,
fees paid over the amount allowed by statute are not properly taxable as costs,
and are therefore not recoverable." Id. (quoting Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, 'jJ 16,
16 P.3d 549).
The Court's Armed Forces dicta apparently states the view that,
notwithstanding the holding in Dugan that" any" consequential damages are
recoverable in fraud cases, litigation expenses (like full expert witness fees) are
not-i.e., that fraud is not one of the limited circumstances where litigation
expenses are recoverable as consequential damages. This reading is supported by

~

the fact that to support its dicta Armed Forces cites only cases that treat expert
witness fees as "costs" under rule 54(d). See id. (citing Young, 2000 UT 91,

(J)

'if'if 14-

16, 16 P.3d 549 (distinguishing "'costs' and other 'expenses,' of litigation, which
may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs" and holding that
it was error to award an expert wih1.ess fee "as a cost"); Frampton v. Wilson, 605
P.2d 771,774 (Utah 1980) (same); Morgan, 795 P.2d at 686-87 (same)). The Armed
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Forces opinion cites no case where full expert wih1ess fees or other "litigation
expenses" were awarded but then capped at the statutory lhnits applicable to
"costs" under rule 54(d). See id.

If Armed Forces is read as just explained- i.e., as expressing the opinion
that fraud is not one of the limited circumstances where litigation expenses are
recoverable as consequential damages-it is inapplicable here since this is a
breach of fiduciary duty case wherein Ms. Kranendonk relies on Campbell for an
award of litigation expenses, not a fraud case wherein the plaintiff relies on
Dugan for an award of litigation expenses.

Defendants assert that Armed Forces must be read as holding that awards
of "litigation expenses" are capped at the statutory limits applicable to awards of
"costs" under rule 54(d). (Br. of Cross-Appellees 37-38.) Defendants' reading of

Armed Forces should be rejected because (1) it treats the dicta therein as a holding;
(2) it would result in awards of "litigation expenses" and awards of "costs" being
equal, which (as noted above) would undermine the purposes behind an award
of litigation expenses; and (3) it is at odds with the opinion's treahnent of the
expert witness fees requested therein as" costs" rather than as" expenses" (as
also noted above).

12
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II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION
OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HIGHBERG CALLED MS. KRANENDONK
A "MORON" AND A "PAIN IN THE ASS."

A.

The trial court erroneously based its rule 403 analysis on a
determination that Highberg' s "moron" and "pain in the ass"
comments were not relevant.

In her opening brief, Ms. Kranendonk first argued, with regard to the
exclusion of Highberg's "1noron" and "pain in the ass" c01n1nents, that the trial
court's exclusion of those c01nrnents amounted to an erroneous relevancy
detennination, not a rule 403 analysis. (Br. of Cross-Appellant 67.) Defendants
disagree (Br. of Cross-Appellees 44-46), but they are mistaken.
During oral argument at trial, Ms. Kranendonk' s counsel observed that for
Ms. Kranendonk to prove her punitive damages claim, she had to show that
Highberg acted with a "1nalicious, willful, wanton or reckless" 1notive when he
(.&)

deceived her. (R. 8778.) Counsel then observed that "the impression that the Jury
[had] been left with" by Highberg's testi1nony was that he was "the night in
shining armor who loved his client and was driven by the magnanimous intent
to protect her from all the stress and worry that would be caused ... by ...
telling her the truth." (R. 8779.) Thus, counsel argued, Highberg had opened the
door to evidence that he actually "harbor[ed] ill will toward Ms. Kranendonk,"
i.e., that he considered her a "pain in the ass" and "moron" (R. 8780), and the
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issue was now whether "the probative value [of that evidence] outvveighs the
prejudice" (R. 8782).
The trial court responded as follows:
I'1n anticipating that [defense counsel] is going to argue something
like when Mr. Highberg made these state1nents in his needle notes
about how he ... thought of her as a pain in the rear or that she was
a moron would suggest frustration, but it hardly suggests that he was

acting against her interest intentionally .
. . . He may have cared deeply about her. He 1nay have been very
interested in prosecuting her case ... and the fact that he got a little
irritated with her from time to thne because she persisted in asking
the same question over and over and that sort of thing, that is not

directly on point. That doesn't suggest that he didn't care about her . ...
(R. 8783-84 (emphasis added).)
In response, Ms. Kranendonk' s counsel stated:
... [T]hat's an inference for the Jury to draw. I mean that's what they
have to do and reasonable inferences they're allowed to draw from
the evidence. [Highberg' s "moron" and "pain in the ass" comments
are] one of the best points of evidence we have if not the only point
we have about his state of 1nind about Jodi Kranendonk .... [T]he
inference that could be drawn is that he didn't tell her because he
didn't care about her. He thought she was a pain in the ass. Thought
she was a moron[.] [A]nd you know what? I'm not going to tell her
[about 1nissing the statute of limitations] until later[.]

(R. 8784.) h1 the end, however, the trial court excluded Highberg's "moron" and
"pain in the ass" comments based on this conclusion: "[I]t just appears that he
was making a note to himself to suggest that there were times she was a little
irritating and he was getting a little impatient in s01ne ways." (R. 8788.)

14
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To say that Highberg's c01n1nents "[did]n't suggest that he did not care
about Ms. Kranendonk," were "not directly on point," and "hardly suggest[] that
he was acting against her interest intentionally"; and to then conclude that" it
just appears that he was making a note to hilnself to suggest that there were
times she was a little irritating and he was getting a little hnpatient in some
~

ways" is to say that Highberg' s cormnents had no tendency to make it more
probable that Highberg had ill motives when he deceived Ms. Kranendonk. In
short, the trial court based its rule 403 ruling on a relevancy detennination. See
Utah R. Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence as that which "has any tendency to
1nake a fact 1nore or less probable"). 4

In State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d 404, this Court noted "the cormnon
misconception that rule 403 is a relevancy rule" and held that when a trial court
bases a rule 403 analysis on "relevancy" instead of "policy," that "constitute[s]

Defendants essentially concede this point when they also say that "[t]he [trial]
court determined that the excluded comments did not connect the frustration Mr.
Highberg experienced ... with his failing to tell her promptly of the missed filing
deadline." (Br. of Cross-Appellees 48.)
Alternatively, the trial court weighed the c01npeting inferences that could
be drawn from Highberg's "moron" and "pain in the ass" cormnents and
decided that one inference was more credible than the other. (See R. 8788.)
However, because the weighing of inferences is the jury's task, State v. Jones, 2016
UT 4, ,r 24,365 P.3d 1212 ("Weighing evidence in search of the most reasonable
inference to be drawn therefrom is the role of the factfinder at trial."), even under
this interpretation of the trial court's analysis, the trial court erred by weighing
inferences instead of weighing probative value against the danger of unfair
prejudice.
4
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error." Id. ,I 21. Thus, by basing its rule 403 analysis on relevancy instead of
policy, the trial court here erred. See id. Accordingly, this Court should re1nand
for retrial of the punitive damages issue and give guidance, in light of Sections C
and D below, to aid the trial court in making a proper rule 403 analysis of the
admissibility of Highberg's "1noron" and "pain in the ass" conunents. See State v.

Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r 61, 192 P.3d 867 (stating that the Court has discretion to
address "issues presented on appeal that will likely arise during retrial" for the
"purpose[] of providing guidance on remand"); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795
(Utah 1991) ("Issues that are fully briefed on appeal and are likely to be
presented on remand should be addressed by this [C]ourt.").

B.

Ms. Kranendonk preserved her foregoing Jaege1"-based
argument for appeal.

Defendants argue that Ms. Kranendonk did not preserve the foregoing
argument for appeal. (Br. of Cross Appellees 42-44.) Again, they are mistaken. As
noted above, Ms. Kranendonk' s counsel argued below that a jury could draw
from Highberg' s "moron" and "pain in the ass" comments an inference in Ms.
Kranendonk' s favor on the issue of whether Highberg was acting to protect Ms.
Kranendonk when he deceived her or whether he was acting out of disregard for
her rights. (R. 8777-78, 8784.) By arguing that there was" an inference for the Jury
to draw" in her favor (R. 8784) and that the rule 403 issue should be decided
based on whether "the probative value outweighs the prejudice" (R. 8782), Ms.
16
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Kranendonk brought to the trial court's attention the very Jaeger-based argu1nent
she now makes on appeal-that the rule 403 issue in this case should not be
decided based on relevancy but, rather, on an analysis of whether the "probative
value [of Highberg's cormnents] is substantially outweighed by a danger of ...
unfair prejudice," Utah R. Evid. 403. Hence, Ms. Kranendonk preserved her
~

Jaeger-based argument for appeal. See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,112,266
P.3d 828 (" An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been 'presented to the
district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it]."'
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
In support of their preservation argument, Defendants cite Zavala v. Zavala,

{,,J!\
\{!)V

2016 UT App 6, 139,366 P.3d 422, for the proposition that "to preserve an
appellate argument that the district court failed to properly conduct a multifactored legal analysis, a litigant must 'specify [the] particular factor that the
court had failed to consider."' (Br. of Cross-Appellees 43.) But here, Ms.
Kranendonk is not arguing that the trial court failed to properly conduct a 1nultifactored legal analysis; she is arguing that the trial court should have ruled
~

Highberg's "moron" and "pain in the ass" c01nments relevant and conducted
rule 403' s single-factored analysis (i.e., whether the probative value of a
particular piece of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, see Utah R. Civ. P. 403), the same argument she made below.
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Defendants also cite 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,

,r 52, 99

P.3d 801, for the proposition that "a blanket objection to the district court's
findings [is] insufficient to preserve for appeal the argument that the district
judge should have 'articulate[d], in greater detail, the steps by which he reached
his ulti1nate conclusion."' (Br. of Cross-Appellees 43.) But again, Ms. Kranendonk
is not arguing that the trial court failed to articulate in sufficient detail the steps
by which it reached its relevancy determination; she is arguing that it should not
II

have based its rule 403 holding on a determination that Highberg' s moron" and
"pain in the ass" cormnents were irrelevant, an argument she made below.
C.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to conclude
that the probative value of Highberg's "moron" and "pain in
the ass" comments was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.

With regard to whether, under a proper rule 403 analysis, it was an abuse
of discretion to exclude Highberg's "moron" and "pain in the ass" cmnments,
Ms. Kranendonk argued in her opening brief that State v. Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143,
329 P.3d 836, strongly suggests that it is an abuse of discretion to exclude the
only effective rebuttal evidence to a party's self-serving testimony on a relevant
issue. (Br. of Cross-Appellant 68-69) Defendants do not disagree. 5

s Defendants say that "a district court does not abuse its discretion by admitting
otherwise inadmissible evidence if that evidence is necessary to rebut the 'central
inference' of testimony presented by another litigant." (Br. of Cross-Appellees 47
(quoting Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143, ,r 42,329 P.3d 836).) They also say that "a

18
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Instead, Defendants argue that Highberg' s excluded c01mnents "were not
necessary to rebut the 'cenh·al inference' of Mr. Highberg's testimony." (Br. of
Cross-Appellees 49.) Specifically, they say that to rebut Highberg's testimony
that he acted solely out of a personal solicitation that he felt for Ms. Kranendonk,
Ms. Kranendonk should have (1) "used the remainder of the Needles notes to
<@

suggest Mr. Highberg' s frustration" or (2) "asked [Highberg on crossexamination] if he found Ms. Kranendonk hard to deal with and therefore might
have had a malicious motive towards her." (Id. at 48-49.) Neither the redacted
Needles notes nor cross-exa1nination of Highberg could have effectively rebutted
the central inference of Highberg's testi1nony. See Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143, ,r 42,
329 P.3d 836 (stating that" only [the challenged evidence] could have effectively
rebutted" the "central inference" of defendant's testimony (emphasis added)).
Nothing in the redacted Needles notes suggests that Highberg felt animus
toward Ms. Kranendonk. (See Pl.'s Exhibit 6 at DEF0033, attached in Addendum I

vb

district court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to admit otherwise
inadmissible evidence that is unnecessary to rebut a central inference of testimony
presented by another litigant." (Id.) But they never address Ms. Kranendonk' s
assertion that it is an abuse of discretion to exclude otherwise inadmissible
evidence when that evidence beco1nes necessary to rebut the central inference of
another litigant's testilnony. (See id. 46-49.)
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to Br. of Cross-Appellees.) They indicate, at most, 1nild annoyance due to the
Kranendonks repeat inquiries regarding a trial date: 6
• "[Mr. Kranendonk] wants to know when h·ial is. I will call him back today
to explain (again) we are years away from that. Discovery phase is just
beginning and we don't even have all the records yet because she is not
done treating. I may need to refer them out." (Id.)
• "[Ms. Kranendonk] is calling constantly asking when her trial date is. I
have told her several times we [won't] get the trial date until we certify it
ready for trial which [won't] happen until discovery is complete." (Id.)
Only the unredacted version of the notes is effective to rebut the inference that
Highberg deceived Ms. Kranendonk only because he cared for her:
• "[Mr. Kranendonk] wants to know when trial is. I will call him back today
to explain (again) we are years away from that. Discovery phase is just
beginning and we don't even have all the records yet because she is not
done treating. These people are becoming a pain in the ass. I may need to refer
them out." (R. 5919, attached in Addendum I to Br. of Cross-Appellees.)

• "This client is a moron. She is calling constantly asking when her trial date
is. I have told her several times we [won't] get the trial date until we certify
it ready for trial which [won't] happen until discovery is complete." (Id.)
Likewise, cross-examining Highberg about his motives for deceiving Ms.
Kranendonk without the possibility of impeaching him with his "moron" and
"pain in the ass" cormnents would have been wholly ineffective. He simply
could have maintained that his deceit of Ms. Kranendonk was motivated by a
There are more Needles notes entries in Defendants' file for Ms. Kranendonk
than the two quoted here. However, the vast majority of the additional entries
(24 of 28 of them) were made by persons other than Highberg, and none of the1n
contain anything to suggest even mild annoyance toward Ms. Kranendonk. (See
Pl.'s Exhibit 6 at DEF0033, attached in Addendu1n I to Br. of Cross-Appellees.)
6

20
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desire to protect her, despite feeling a 1nild am1oyance due to her "constantly
asking when her trial date is." (Pl.'s Exhibit 6 at DEF0033, attached in Addendu1n
I to Br. of Cross-Appellees.)
Because Defendants tacitly concede that it is an abuse of discretion to
exclude the only effective rebuttal evidence to a party's self-serving testimony
~

and then fail to identify any other evidence that could have been used to
effectively rebut the inference that Highberg was motivated only by his care for
Ms. Kranendonk, the Court should hold that it was an abuse of discretion to
exclude Highberg's "1noron" and "pain in the ass" comments.
D.

The trial court's errors in excluding Highberg's "moron" and
"pain in the ass" comments were not harmless.

Defendants argue that, in any event, the trial court's failure to conduct a
rule 403 analysis and its exclusion of Highberg' s "moron" and u pain in the ass"
co1nments were hannless. 7 (Br. of Cross-Appellees 49-51.)

1.

The frial coU1·t's erro1· in basing its rule 403 analysis on
a televancy determination was not harmless.

First, Defendants 1nake the bald assertion that if Judge Reese had done a
proper rule 403 analysis, instead of 1naking a relevancy determination, he would
have reached the same conclusion that Judge Himonas did prior to trial. (See Br.
7

Ms. Kranendonk did not expressly de1nonstrate in her opening brief why the
trial court's errors were hannful. However, "if an appellant responds in the reply
brief to a new issue raised by the appellee in its opposing brief, the issue is not
waived." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ,r 24, 16 P.3d 540.

21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of Cross-Appellees 50.) However, prior to trial, Judge Hilnonas properly held
that Highberg' s "1noron" and "pain in the ass'' connnents were relevant because
of "the indifference and disregard" they showed toward Ms. Kranendonk' s
rights; and, although he said that at that point their probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, he also said that
"this is one issue that 1nay be readdressed as the evidence is developed" at trial.

(R. 8229-30, 5389.)
In contrast, Judge Reese did not even believe that Highberg's c01nments
were relevant and did not even mention rule 403's standard of probative value
being substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (See 8776-78,
8783-84, 8787-88.) If Judge Reese had properly applied rule 403 instead of making
an erroneous relevancy determination, there is a reasonable likelihood that a
different result would have been reached. Indeed, any time a judge properly
applies the law there is a reasonable likelihood that he will reach a different
result than if he fails to properly apply the law. Thus, Judge Reese's error in
conducting a relevancy analysis (or usurping the jury's role and weighing
competing inferences) instead of conducting a proper rule 403 analysis was
prejudicial. See Kerby v. Moab Valley Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App 280, ,r 24,362
P.3d 944 (stating that an error is not harmless if" there is a reasonable likelihood
that a different result would have been reached absent the error").

22
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2.

The frial cow·t's abuse of discretion in excluding Highberg' s
mo1·on" and ''pain in the ass" comments was not ltannless.
0

Finally, Defendants argue that, regardless of the analysis that led to their
exclusion, "any error in not admitting the Needles notes in their entirety was
equally hannless." (Br. of Cross-Appellees 50.) But the only support they offer
for that argument is an assertion that the "the other Needles notes that had been
admitted [and cross-examination based on the1n] could have served [the same]
purpose" as Highberg' s redacted comments. (Id.) However, as explained above,
~

the redacted Needles notes and any cross-examination based on them could not
have served the same purpose as the unredacted notes. See supra pp. 19-21. The

@

umedacted Needles notes were the only evidence that could have effectively
rebutted Highberg's self-serving testimony that he deceived Ms. Kranendonk
only to protect her, and exclusion of the only evidence on an essential ele1nent of
a party's claim is always prejudicial. See, e.g., Life v. Sunbanks, Ltd., 176 Wash.
App. 1005, 2013 WL 4501459, *5 (holding that "the trial court's improper
exclusion of [the] only evidence [on the central issue] of actual notice was not
harmless"); State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714, 714 (Iowa 1988) (holding that exclusion
of "the only direct evidence ... of the ele1nents of the offense" was not harmless);

Klatt v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 211 N.E.2d 720, 727 (Ill. 1965) (holding that the
(;i)

improper exclusion of "the only evidence tending to establish willful and wanton
misconduct ... may hardly be called harmless").
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CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the trial court's refusal to award Ms.
Kranendonk her reasonable and necessary litigation expenses and remand for a
determination of those expenses. This Court should also reverse the trial court's
exclusion of Highberg's "moron" and "pain in the ass" co1nments; re1nand for
retrial of her punitive damages claim; and provide guidance regarding a proper
rule 403 analysis in this case since the issue will likely arise during retrial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi~ay of June 2017.
PECK HADFIELD BAXTER & MOORE, LLC

Brandon J. Baxter
Matthew David Lorz
John D. Luthy
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Jodi Kranendonk
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